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In this cost-constrained era, when it comes to responding tothreats 
in dangerous coastal water·s, a single-purpose hip is best suited to 
the task. 
S ince the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy's large, multipurpose surface warships-nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs), guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), 
and amphibious ships-have been able to efficiently 
deliver combat power to the land from a safe sanctuary 
at sea. Multipurpose warships made sense 25 years ago, 
and they will continue to be best in situations in which 
the threat of attack is small. But safety is no longer 
assured in the open sea, and the more constricted littoral 
waters of many important coastal regions have become 
downright dangerous for these vessels. 
Conducting attacks against the Soviet mainland was 
always a high-risk, high-reward endeavor. As the Cold 
War progressed, the Soviets developed a robust array 
of antiship missiles that grew in variety, reach, warhead 
size, numbers, and homing accuracy; they could put 
big warships out of action with one or two hits. As a 
consequence, the U.S. Navy had to revise its method of 
surviving missile attacks from the armor and sturdy hulls 
of the battleship era. Active defenses against assaults had 
to be developed, including defending aircraft, surface-
to-air missiles, close-in weapons, jamming, decoys, and 
deception. And they had to be virtually impenetrable. 
Today, the ever-more-capable missile threat is even more 
demanding. The precision tracking, targeting, and homing 
capabilities of modem projectiles have enhanced the value 
of small combatants because they can distribute offensive 
power more widely than a DOG or an aircraft carrier too 
big to launch and recover modem combat aircraft. When 
ships must sail in dangerous waters, a single-purpose vessel 
is far superior to an open-ocean multipurpose one . ....., 
Responding toSurprise ... 
How can U.S. Navy ships, built for extensive lifespans, 
stay relevant in such a rapidly changing world? American 
warships are programmed to last as long as 30 to 40 
years to amortize the considerable costs of their multiple 
capabilities. This a hazardous state of affairs; just consider 
the inaccuracies of the long-term projections we made 
in 1975 regarding how the now-contemporary operating 
environment would look geopolitically, economically, and 
technologically. This was well before the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the rise of the People's Republic of China, 
the onset of severe budget deficits, the widespread influence 
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of cyber links and operations, and the development of 
robotic weapons-to name a few of the bigger changes. 
The National Research Council warned about the 
consequences of depending on large, costly, long-lived 
warships in a study published in 2013: 
In a cost-constrained environment, when envisioning a 
low-threat situation or scenarios where there is little risk 
of loss of life or ships being damaged, building fewer 
but more expensive weapon systems and multipurpose 
ships is economically rational. More capability can be 
provided at sea with fewer hulls, crews, logistics, and 
total life-cycle costs. When, however, there is a risk 
of that ship being damaged or sunk because there is a 
high probability of a tactical surprise attack, the reverse 
is true-that is, cost-effectiveness becomes "too many 
eggs in one basket." A damaging hit on a DDG hull is 
degradation not just of the fleet's air and missile defense 
capacity but also of ASW [antisubmarine warfare], 
antisurface, maritime interdiction operations, support for 
Marines ashore, and helicopter-related missions as well. 
Building more but less-expensive, single-mission ships 
may increase fleet resilience to absorb the impact of an 
unanticipated threat at sea, and provide more options 
for response through geographic dispersion as well as 
greater ship availability for quick modifications.• 
While the emphasis in this article is on the operational 
and tactical advantages of simpler, more affordable 
warships, the observations of the National Research 
Council are equally as important. Smaller ships that 
have resilience against technological surprise due to 
their easier-to-modify designs are Jess costly to replace 
than larger warships. 
Perils of the Littorals 
Foreign littoral waters have become an unsafe place 
to operate on the sea surface. 2 Although the bulk of 
U.S. naval action has been in coastal waters since 1950, 
their significance has increased with the rise of China, 
the continuing threat from Iran, and the recent ventures 
of other countries, such as Russia . In these narrow 
seas, early warning and constant alertness are harder to 
achieve. Depth of fire is lost for lack of sea room. The 
clutter of inlets, differing coastlines and islands, coastal 
shipping, fishing boats, and oil rigs are all factors that 
complicate both offensive and defensive tactics. 
For many reasons, a single-purpose ship is far 
preferable to an open -ocean multipurpose ship in 
situations that require a vessel to sail in these dangerous 
areas. The advantage of the single-purpose ship can be 
clearly illustrated by using lost combat capabilities 
as the basis of co mparison. Assume a noti onal 
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On 25 Aprll, the N/m/~class aln:ralt carrier USS Jahn C. st,nnls(CVH:14) axils drydock while undergoing maintenance. Slnca Iha and of Iha Cold 
War, Iha U.S. Navy has usad large multipurpose warships uch as carriers to provide combat power to Iha land from Iha sea. 
multipurpose ship has four. These might be surface-
missile warfare, antisubmarine warfare, mine clearance, 
and the employment of helicopters or unmanned aerial 
vehicles. Since there is a high probability that one modem 
antiship cruise missile will put either ship out of action, 
the advantage in missile combat is 4: I in favor of the 
single-purpose ship; when the multipurpose ship is put 
out of action in a missile battle, the Fleet also loses all 
its other capabilities. This is a tactical measure of combat 
advantage. 
From an operational or campaign perspective, we must 
talce account of design efficiency and ship endurance. 
The hypothetical multipurpose ship has the advantage of 
performing four different missions when the chance of it 
being lost is smaJI. Another benefit is that one propulsion 
plant moves all four combat capabilities. This operational 
advantage can be shown by using a new metric of lost mobile 
combat capabilities. To do that, we must now divide both 
ships into mobility and combat components. Assume that 
the space, manning, and cost of the mobility and combat 
components in a single-purpose ship are the same and the 
value of each is one unit. If we give a multipurpose ship 
its same four combat capabilities and assert its propulsion 
capability requires only two units to move its four combat 
capabilities, the single-purpose ship's lead is reduced from 
4: I to 3: I. (The lost value of the single-purpose, mobile 
missile ship is two. The lost value of the mobile multipurpose 
ship in combat capabilities is four but the mobility loss is 
only two. The ratio of losses is therefore now 6:2 or 3: 1.) 
We should malce one more comparison of lost value. 
A much-admired peacetime advantage of a large U.S. 
Navy multi-mission warship is that it carries the logistical 
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support to stay at sea unreplenished for several weeks. 
The small missile ship should not carry sustainment for 
more than a short time because it is expected to fight in 
dangerous waters. Since it carries only a small missile 
load, it must return to base to rearm after a battle. Thus, 
the missile combatant should be supported from a base 
or tender that is close to the operating area. The littoral 
combat ship (LCS) will also be forward based, in places 
such as Singapore and Rota, Spain. 
If the vessel carries substantial self-sustainment, it will 
lose that non-combat capability when it is put out of action. 
Taking the loss into account quantitatively, a third comparison 
might be the following, using the metric of lost sustainable, 
mobile combat capabilities. When sustainment-valued at 
two units of stores, fuel, food, and additional personnel-is 
added to the total loss of value, the new metric favors the 
single-purpose ship over the multipurpose ship in the ratio of 
4: I again. Sustainment built into a warship is no advantage 
if the ship is lost in action. 
Support from Salvo Equations 
Ships expose themselves to loss when they must fight 
to defeat an enemy. A different method of quantitative 
comparison-simple salvo equation s that measure the 
performance of two opposing surface forces fighting in 
the missile era-can show the combat advantage of this.3 
According to the equations, if you have three times as many 
ships as I do, then for parity in fractional losses each of my 
ships must have three times the offensive power, three times 
the defensive power, and three times the staying power 
of your ships. Operationally spealcing, if you put one of 







power, its defensive power, and also its staying power value, 
since my crippled ship is no longer a threat to draw your 
fire. Thus, the number of ships in your battle force is the 
single most important combat property you can have. 
These well-tested mathematical equations also show 
how a more numerous and distributed force has more 
tactical choices-for example, to conduct a swift-swarm 
attack, approach by stealth, or conduct a coordinated 
assault from several directions simultaneously. As the 
attackers, a fleet of small, lethal ships choose the time 
and place to hunt and strike. The burden of achieving an 
ever-alert defense thus becomes the enemy's problem.4 
The equations demonstrate quantitatively that an 
unstable situation results when the staying power of a 
combat formation is small. The formation's staying power 
is the product of the number of ships in it and the amount 
of missile hits needed to put one ship out of action. The 
U.S. Navy will have fewer and fewer ships in its blue-
water fleet, and only a small capacity in each vessel to 
take missile hits and continue to fight. The consequence 
is a brittle, unstable situation. 
A small change in the offense, defense, or number of 
ships on either side will change a result from total victory 
(no losses) to total defeat (all ships out of action) after 
only a minor change in the inputs. (This is a mathematical 
artifact of the equations, but most naval officers would 
agree that a numerically small force of big warships 
with little staying power is undesirable and probably is 
an unstable fighting unit.) For missile warfare, a more 
numerous force that is well trained for littoral combat will 
reduce our brittleness when fighting in dangerous waters. 
The same weight of ordnance can put out of action the 
bigger multipurpose ship as the small missile ship. For 
example, in World War II, one torpedo hit could cripple 
anything up to a 12,000-ton cruiser and sometimes sink it. 
The USS Stark (FFG-31), HMS Sheffield, and SS Atlantic 
..._ 
Conveyer were ships of significant size that were rendered 
ineffective in the 1980s after one Exocet missile hit. 
Although there are no combat data for a warship of 10,000 
tons hit by a missile, information from World War II and 
more recent experimental data suggest that one missile 
will usually put a DDG out of action.5 
A Tale of Four Cushlngs 
The meaning of "multi-mission," "multi-capability," 
"multi-function," or "multipurpose" ship is clear. But 
no definition of "single-purpose warship" is entirely 
satisfactory. Every warship's employment will change, 
depending on whether current American policy toward 
another state, such as China, is at the moment one of 
cooperation, competition, confrontation, or conflict. The 
evolution of the functions of "single-purpose" Navy 
vessels, all named Cushing, epitomizes why the term's 
meaning is opaque by nature. 
In 1952, I was assigned to the USS Cushing 
(DD-797), my first destroyer, a 2,500-ton multi-capability 
ship. Although she was assigned many tasks, she was built 
for one purpose: to escort bigger, more valuable vessels. 
A member of the large Fletcher class of destroyers, 
she had been commissioned during World War II when 
destroyer flexibility was already well established. Even 
though Fletchers were designed to protect aircraft carriers 
or amphibious ships, it became known they were also 
quite effective in night battles, most famously in the 
Solomon Islands under the leadership of Rear Admirals 
"Pug" Ainsworth and "Tip" Merrill, and Commanders 
Arleigh Burke and Fred Moosbrugger. 
Upon arriving in early 1943, after six months of 
mediocre battle performance, Burke pointed out that 
radar gave the U.S. Navy the potentially decisive tactical 
advantage; the torpedo, not the fast-firing 5-inch gun, was 
the decisive weapon; and fighting in a column formation 
On 18 May 1987, Iha guldad-mlsslla frlgat11 USS Stark(FFG-31) bums aH11r being hit by an Iraqi-launched Exocat mlsslle aday aarllar. MTha sama 
weight or onlnanca can put out or action Iha bigger multlpurposa hip as Iha small mlsslla ship," Iha author says. The Stark was r1nd1n1d lnattec-
llva attar ona hit, negating Iha usefulness of all DI har capabllllas. 
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The USS Cushing (TB·1) torpedo boat w11 In U.S. Navy service between 1890 and 1912. Although sbe w11 Iha forebear of largar mulllpurposa 
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was a foolhardy carry-over from prewar daytime tactics . 
When his new tactics were adopted, U.S. destroyers started 
to win clear-cut victories over Imperial Japanese Navy 
warships in the littorals of the central and upper Solomons . 
(It is no small irony that DD-797 was named for the USS 
Cushing [DD-376], a 1,500-ton prewar destroyer that had 
been sunk fighting 30,000-ton Japanese battleships in the 
first night battle of Guadalcanal before the Navy learned 
how to attack with cruisers and destroyers.) 
During most of my years of active duty from 1952 to 
1982, destroyers and cruisers were categorized as "major 
fleet escorts" well after they had developed an independent 
missile-attack capability . A modern DOG epitomizes the 
multipurpose ship . However , destroyers originated as 
single-purpose ships, starting with the first USS Cushing 
(TB-1), a 120-ton torpedo boat (TB) commissioned in 
1890. Although she was designed to join in swarm attacks 
in coastal waters against enemy battleships, she was sent 
to patrol the Cuban coast during the Spani sh-American 
War in 1898. 
All big navies knew that something had to defend 
battleships against TBs. ''Torpedo boat destroyers" were 
soon invented, and well before World War I they subsumed 
the TBs' purpose. Destroyers would practice fighting each 
other-not for their own sakes, but to attack or defend 
against attacks on battleships and transports , The second 
USS Cushing (DD-55), which displaced 1,200 tons, was 
typical of destroyers commi ssioned before and during 
World War I. In short order the destroyer role was expanded 
to protect warships and commercial vessels from submarine 
attacks. By the time I reported to DD-797, destroyers 
perfonned air-defense and radar-picket duty as well. 
Thus, it is no simple matter to say what one means 
by a single-purpose ship. Single -purpose ships like the 
first Cushing (TB-1) are exemplified by the American 
Pegasus-class hydrofoils, fast -attack patrol boats in 
service between the late 1970s to early 1990s, and the 
contemporary Chinese Type 022 Houbei design s. Both 
the Pegasus and Houbei classes replaced torpedoes with 
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surface -to-surface missiles . Both classes displace 250 tons 
and · were designed for a single deadly purpose. As the 
...._21st century progresses, doubtless a new single-purpose 
combatant will be adapated for ancillary employments -
if and when we build and deploy these small ships. But 
auxiliary tasks must not distract from their utility as low-
cost, high-lethality missile combatants that can be put at 
risk in dangerous waters . 
The Case with Real Ships 
A new DOG will cost about $2 billion . For that price 
it has many valuable capabilities, more than the four in 
our notional multi -mission ship. A DOG has efficient 
propulsion and sustainment to move it and maintain 
its combat capabilities on long and distant peacetime 
deployments . If we prorate the cost of the modules that 
support their multi -mission combat capabilities, the 
Navy's two LCS designs both cost on the order of $600 
miUion each. Both designs are speedy, but neither has a 
propulsion system designed for long endurance . An LCS 
is not intended to stay at sea unrcplenished for very long, 
so the best way to operate a squadron is from a forward 
base at places like Singapore, Sasebo, Darwin, Bahrain, 
Rota, or Naples. 
A blue -water frigate epitomizes the ship Secretary 
of Defense Chuck Hagel described to replace the LCS. 
His imagined frigate will cost as much as an LCS : $500 
million or more . It will have about the same number of 
billets and must be multipurpose. Its design can be adapted 
from many existing foreign frigates, some of which 
are being built now in U.S. shipyards. The new frigate 
should serve as a blue-water combatant to replace our lost 
DD-963s and FFG-7s. We can buy four or five new-design 
frigates for the cost of one new DOG. Frigates will help 
keep our blue -water fleet numbers up for operations in 
carrier strike groups (CSGs), expeditionary strike groups 
(ESGs), and surface action groups. 
But the new frigates arc not suitable for fighting in the 







crewed, single-purpose warship designed exclusively for 
missile combat in dangerous waters such as the China Seas, 
the Yellow Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, the Persian 
Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and perhaps very soon the Sea of 
Japan, the Baltic, and the Black, Red, or Aegean seas. A 
flotilla of, say, 8 to I 6 will be forward based in the critical 
area hosted by U.S. Navy friends or allies. They should 
have simple, affordable hulls and unremarkable propulsion 
plants. Operational stay time will be one or two weeks 
of peacetime steaming, or a few days for each sequential 
wartime-strike mission. Affordability and a small combat 
crew are dominant considerations, because one missile hit 
is certain to render the vessel useless. After a hit, the tactical 
aim should be to abandon the ship and save the crew. 
No existing corvette is quite the correct design, because 
small navies have to load their limited number of surface 
ships with multiple missions, including search, patrol, 
coast guard duties, and many others. A suitable goal for 
an austere, single -purpose, uniquely American missile 
design is a 500 , ton ship costing $100 million. If the 
goal is unachievable within our procurement system, it 
does not diminish the need for a littoral combatant that 
is better suited than the LCS-which was, after all, our 
first attempt to produce such a ship in many years. 
Pessimistically speaking, a missile corvette could 
require two or more designs in tandem to achieve my 
minimalist goal. For comparison I will assume our first 
such ship displaces 1,000 tons and costs $200 million. If 
so, for $200 million we can still have ten of them for the 
cost of one DDG, and three of them instead of one LCS. 
With the $ 10 billion budget wedge from the 20 LCSs that 
were recently canceled, we can buy ten tleet frigates for 
sustained open ocean operations, and 25 first-generation 
missile corvettes for littoral combat in waters where more 
costly ships should not be put at risk. 
Eventually, the Navy might decide to buy single-purpose 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships, mine countermeasures 
ships (MCMs), and naval gunfire support ships. Meanwhile, 
the 32 LCSs it is building can play their intended roles for 
inshore ASW, MCM, and countering swarm attacks. 
Furthermore, other studies have demonstrated that many 
ships in a U.S. Navy component for littoral operations 
need cost only a small fraction of the procurement and 
operating costs of the whole Fleet, on the order of 5 percent 
of funding for Navy shipbuilding and conversion, military 
personnel, and operation and maintenance. 6 Despite its 
small budget share, the littoral fleet will increase its total 
numbers and availability for a worldwide presence. Small 
combatants are ideal for cooperative operations and joint 
training with friendly coastal navies around the world . 
Ships for fighting in the littorals are a niche capability 
to fill a void. They should be numerous, yet take only a 
Sailors Una Iha rails ol tha guldad-mlsslla d stroyar USS Wayne E. Mfyer(DDG-108) as she arrlv•s In Busan, Republic ol Korea, on 24 April. 
wlarga, expansive warships and transports will and should comprlsa Iha greater part ol our Fleet," 1h11 author contends. "Bui a llotllla ol mlsslla 
ships Is designed ror llghllng awar, not making war." 
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small budget fraction. The expensive part of the Navy will 
continue to ensure safe sea lines of communications for all 
peaceful nations and to project and sustain large quantities 
of combat power onto land at select locations. 
In summary, three basic forms of quantitative analysis 
all demonstrate the marked advantage of single-purpose 
missile ships for littoral combat: 
• Measured in lost value after being put out of action, the 
advantage of a single-purpose ship is roughly proportional 
to the number of capabilities carried in a multi-mission 
ship. 
• Salvo equations show parametrically that the number of 
ships in a fighting force is its most valuable property for 
missile combat. 
• When procurement cost is explicitly measured, the equal-
cost numerical advantage of single-purpose missile ships 
stands out. 
New Tactics and Methods 
joint, campaign -level doctrine . • .. This contrarian 
tactician's point of view is that a new "play book" is 
needed for winning battles along a hostile shore.7 
That nothing has changed since 1995 was demonstrated 
by recent discussions at NPS with Swedish Navy and 
Marine officers who have trained and are proficient in 
the Baltic. They described the differences in coastal 
environments of Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, and 
Danish waters and called them the "extreme littoral s." 
The Swedish officers pointed out the many advantage s 
they train to exploit. They regard their coastal waters as 
a defenders' advantage. Rather than seeing fishing boats, 
coastal trade, and other coastal clutter as liabilities, the 
Swedes suggest that for an aggressive defense a nation 
may take a proactive approach to clear or augment the 
clutter to its advantage. 
My message is identical to theirs: Know your tactics, 
know your enemy, know the territory, and know how to 
fight with friends in ways quite different from our blue-,. . 
water fleet expenence. 
A more general discussion of the littoral environment '-As Rear Admiral Benyamin Telem of the Israeli 
would include the logistical vulnerabilities of land bases . Defense Force has said, "Under no circumstances should 
and the mobile combat logistics force, which are specific ships become big or expensive in equipment to the extent 
to enemies and geography. The dialogue would also have that their defense becomes a first priority requirement in 
to address the intimate connection between an air campaign itself. This would inevitably negate their offensive value." 
above and an undersea campaign be~eath the surface. An Large, expensive warships and transports will and should 
interesting relations~ip between the air and. su':a~e batt~es comprise the greater part of our Fleet. When measu~ed 
is a reverse of what 1s true of valuable mult1-m1ss1on ships in displacement, delivery capacity, and cost, they provide 
that are severely disadvantaged vis-a-vis aircraft attacks. large quantities of ordnance and troops proficiently. But 
Small, single-purpose vessels can pose a threat to enemy a flotilla of missile ships is designed for fighting a war, 
ships at sea that an opponent can ignore only at his peril. not making war. Its special value is to help keep the peace 
If his aircraft undertake a difficult search-and-attack ~!fort by visibly affirming support for our allies, and deterring 
against them, this will consume air resources that will be prospective enemies by overtly confronting them at a 
subtracted from his battle for air superiority. . . critical point in littoral waters. When our warships are 
The details of every littoral operation are different, but it intended to fight there, a flotilla of relatively inexpensive 
is obvious that each requires new and flexible Fleet doctri~e single-purpose ships is preferable to pricey multi-mission 
and tactics. New methods of command and control will warships. * 
be important to naval tactics. CSGs and ESGs cannot 
function and fight without detectable electromagnetic 
radiations within the ideal of "network-centric warfare." 
But command-and-control of flotilla operations can 
exploit new ways of fighting under what might be called 
"network-optional warfare," a term coined by Professor 
Don Brutzman, who is pursuing a variety of technologies 
to enhance semi-silent and undetectable operations at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). We can become adept 
at infrequent, hard-to-detect emissions to conduct sudden 
attack in the littorals. Achieving proficiency and cooperative 
action will take tactical development and training, done 
most usefully in the waters where fighting may ensue, and 
in collaboration with the countries with prior experience 
that we are supporting with a combined "1,000-Ship Navy." 
In a 1995 Naval War College Review article, "The 
Power in Doctrine," I wrote, 
The U.S. Navy does not have current tactical doctrine for 
fighting a fleet on the littoral, nor does it have substantial 
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